Legal framework on freedom of religion and actual application
The Constitution of Uzbekistan protects religious freedom (Article 31) and the government is required not to interfere in the affairs of religious groups (Article 61); however, this right is effectively limited by other legal instruments and by unduly restrictive government practices.
A new religion law, the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations Act, adopted on 5 July 2021, is an improvement over previous legislation, but still falls short of the expectations and recommendations of international observers.
On the positive side, the new legislation reduces the number of founding members needed to register a religious organisation (from 100 to 50) and eliminates the ban on wearing religious clothes in public. However, it makes the process of registration more complex by requiring, among other things, founders to live in the same district.
What is more, some restrictions that severely restricted religious practices remained in place, such as the ban on unregistered activity, the need for prior approval for the publication and distribution of religious material, and strict limits to religious education.
Observers reacted positively to the new law appreciating the distinction between mission and proselytising. In addition to defining both concepts, the new law prohibits putting pressure on people to change religion.
Incidents and developments
Uzbekistan, because of its geography located at the heart of the Great Silk Road, has historically served as bridge between East and West and is characterized by an ecumenical spirit. Coexistence between cultures and religions dates back centuries: a Jewish presence stretches back about 2000 years; Muslims arrived in the 8th century AD and, “until the 13th century, a large community of Nestorian Christians lived here. In addition, Soviet domination favored the arrival and mixing of different nationalities”. According to Uzbek government statistics, there are today: “2,277 organizations of 16 different religious confessions” in the nation wherein “2094 are Islamic communities, based in 2067 mosques; 166 Christian religious organizations, 8 Jewish communities, 6 Bahà'í communities, a Hare Krishna society, a Buddhist temple. There is also the Interfaith Biblical Society of Uzbekistan.”
Although, a climate of general tolerance prevails towards members of minority religions, especially if they belong to foreign ethnic groups, the same cannot be said for ethnic Uzbeks who are Christian, subject to pressure and persecution from relatives and the wider community. In its report, Open Doors cites at least 64 cases of converts who are victims of pressure and violence (both physical and mental) by their family, community, and co-workers following their conversion.
The small Uzbek Catholic community is divided into five parishes and numbers about 3,000 people. Its presence is accepted and characterised by significant educational activities, resulting in some vocations among ethnic Uzbeks. Following the arrival of a new priest, sent to renew pastoral activity in Samarkand, activities in the city received a new impetus through repairs to the church and the establishment of a small oratory that represents a useful instrument of apostolate.
Despite the new religion law, registration is still an uphill struggle for many faith groups. Procedures remain complex, and the process is discretionary depending often on documents that local authorities sometimes arbitrarily agree or refuse to provide. This is complicated by the difficulty of finding buildings without prior registration to use for religious services and as a legal address for the community. Jehovah's Witnesses, for example, have been unable to register in Tashkent and Samarkand, while Shia Muslims have been trying for a long time, unsuccessfully, to reopen the Hoji Bahrom mosque in Bukhara.
In the past year, government control over various forms of religious expression has remained strong and oppressive. The obligation imposed on mosques to install surveillance cameras inside and outside at their own expense was extended to non-Islamic communities at the start of 2022 with the Interior Ministry retaining the video recordings. In addition to being a financial burden, this requirement has led to fears in the various religious groups as the monitoring of ordinary life inevitably makes them more vulnerable to punitive actions and retaliation.
The government is especially interested in monitoring Muslims, the country’s majority religious group, both from within by appointing clerics supervising the content of sermons and the number and location of mosques, and from without by compelling the faithful to follow the state-propagated secular version of the faith.
Over the past year, some restrictive practices already in place under the previous administration to discourage Islamic devotion reappeared, such as forcing Muslim men in different parts of the country to shave their beards. As a result, the US ambassador to Uzbekistan, Daniel Rosenblum, stated that such violations of religious freedoms could undermine the reforms undertaken over the past five years.
Thanks to the new religion law, a positive development was reported in September 2021 when the Minister of Education announced that girls would be allowed to wear certain styles of veil in schools, which was previously prohibited. Despite this, in December various Muslim bloggers and activists posted videos showing staff in state universities trying to convince female students not to wear the hijab.
Private religious education is prohibited in Uzbekistan. It is possible to enrol in one of the 14 institutions that offer religious education, but only after completing high school. The number of applications is far higher than the number of places. This has resulted in the creation of underground Islamic classes, which are promptly closed with their organisers punished as soon as they are discovered by law enforcement. In Tashkent for example, police arrested four Muslim women in February 2022 and fined them the equivalent of an average two-week salary for providing religious lessons without proper authorisation. Similarly, three women involved in illegal teaching were sanctioned in August 2021 in Tashkent’s Uchtepa district.
Over the past year, religious education abroad has also come under scrutiny. Some 1,500 students attending religious schools in Egypt and Turkey were repatriated in June 2021. At the same time, studying abroad has become increasingly monitored with enrolment in foreign schools subject to prior approval by the government’s Committee for Religious Affairs (CRA). To fill the gap in religious education, the authorities launched Hidoyat Sari (Guidance towards the Path of Truth), an Islamic-themed TV station in 2021 to disseminate government-approved positions on Islam and exclude alternative views.
The fear of being charged with private religious teaching has prompted many Muslims to avoid staying outside mosques, or meeting in private homes, to discuss their faith or exchange ideas about religion.
In March 2022, Nosir Numanov was sentenced to 15 days in prison after he was found praying with friends at a teahouse. Abdumannon Kadyrov, the owner of the establishment, was fined the equivalent of 10 months’ average wages. He was not the only businessman targeted for allowing Muslim prayers; in Tashkent, Farkhod Rakhmonov, owner of a car showroom, was fined in February 2022 the equivalent of eight months’ wages for allowing his employees to pray at work.
On 23 June, a Bukhara regional court sentenced 47-year-old Bobirjon Tukhtamurodov to five years and one month for taking part in a study group on the works of Turkish Muslim theologian Nursi between 2006 and 2010. Tukhtamurodov had returned from exile in Russia after the Uzbek government assured him that he would not be jailed.
Journalists and bloggers have also been targeted by the authorities to prevent the spread of ideas that do not conform with the government-sponsored form of religion. In these cases, they were fined for writing on religious topics or publishing material without prior CRA approval. Fines were also imposed on some news sites like Azon.uz and Kun.uz for publishing articles on religion, including interviews with local Muslims about Ramadan.
One blogger targeted was Fozilxoja Orifxojaev. Known for his criticism of the government’s restrictive religious policies, he was sentenced on 26 January 2022 to seven and a half years in prison for possessing and disseminating religious material, after he published a post on Facebook discussing the appropriateness of Muslims to greet non-Muslims on their religious holidays. Orifxojaev’s health has seriously deteriorated over the seven months spent in pre-trial detention, during which he was also ill-treated.
Other Muslims have also been sentenced to long prison terms under Article 244-1 of the Penal Code for producing, storing, distributing, and displaying materials threatening public security and order via mass media and the Internet. In one such incident, Khasan Abdirakhimov was sentenced in April 2022 to four years in prison for putting “likes” under some religious posts and sharing them online. Oybek Khamidov was sentenced to a five-year prison sentence in May 2022 for sharing an audio sermon with his wife. However, according to the family, the sentence was imposed in retaliation against his younger brother Muhammadaziz Turgunov, who fled fearing arrest after he was questioned for talking with friends about Islam in a teahouse.
A few days later, a court in Karakalpakstan sentenced trauma surgeon Alimardon Sultonov, a devout Muslim known for discussing issues related to freedom of religion and belief, to seven years in a labour camp for criticising President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and state-appointed imams.
In October 2021, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) released a report on Uzbek prisoners of conscience sentenced to prison terms for peacefully practising their religious beliefs. According to the report, although many of them were freed by Mirziyoyev after he came to power, more than 2,000 still languish in jail serving sometimes very long terms for vaguely defined charges of extremism; often these charges are based solely on alleged membership in banned groups with no actual evidence of involvement in, or connection to, violence or other criminal activities.
The USCIRF report also outlined the difficult conditions and abuses endured by inmates in prison, ranging from torture to the arbitrary extension of prison sentences. The publication also highlighted the fact that sometimes prisoners are denied the right to practise their religion freely in prison, denied the opportunity to recite traditional Islamic prayers or fast during Ramadan, and have limited access to religious texts. Over the reporting period, prisoners of conscience have also been reportedly abused. Tulkun Astanov, sentenced in January 2021 to five years in prison, endured torture and saw his health seriously deteriorate while in detention.
On the positive side, the USCIRF report points to the release in June 2021 of Khayrullo Tursunov and Habibullah Madmarov after 21 years of illegal imprisonment following an extensive international campaign.
During the period under review, authorities arrested several people for allegedly belonging to extremist groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir. In June 2021, multiple arrests took place in the regions of Samarkand, Sirdarya, and Jizzakh, for activities related to religious extremism or the spread of extremist ideas. In November 2021, alleged members of Katiba al-Tawhid wal-Jihad were arrested in the Tashkent region. In late January 2022, Uzbek security services announced the detention of 30 suspected extremists. That same month, a court in Termez sentenced two men to more than 15 years in prison for involvement in extremist organisations.
Prospects for religious freedom
With the rise to power of Shavkat Mirziyoyev in 2016 following the death of strongman Islam Karimov, an important reform process began that was highlighted in the “Strategy 2017-2021”. Since that time, there have been moves in the country to undertake a new economic direction, show greater international openness, and provide greater freedom to civil society. For faith groups, there has also been a window of hope, as the Strategy also prioritised “inter-ethnic harmony and religious tolerance”.
Recently, however, Uzbek authorities have shown less respect for freedom of religion and conscience even as expressed through social media, giving reason to doubt whether the country will pursue on a path of reform, and finally guarantee fundamental freedoms including freedom of religion, or revert to authoritarian practices. Prospects for this human right, therefore, should be kept under observation.
Uzbekistan