Legal background and actual application
The Turkish constitution defines the country as a secular state (Article 2). It guarantees freedom of conscience, religious belief, conviction, expression and worship. Article 24 prohibits discrimination on religious grounds and the exploitation or abuse of “religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion.”
Religious matters come under the jurisdiction of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), a state agency established in 1924 (Article 136) to replace the Ottoman-era religious authority (Shayk al-Islam) after the abolition of the Caliphate. It operates under the president’s office, promoting the teachings and practices of Sunni Islam. For 2022, the Turkish government allocated TRY 16.09 billion (US$1.7 billion, 24 percent more than 2021) in state funds to the Presidency, more than what seven other major ministries and most state institutions receive.
Religious instruction is mandatory in state-maintained primary and secondary schools, where only Sunni Islam is taught. Only Christian or Jewish students may apply for an exemption from these classes upon the request of their parents. The government continues to refuse to exempt Alevi or other faiths from compulsory Sunni Islamic education. The government interprets restrictively the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, which refers to “non-Muslim minorities”, and so has granted special legal minority status to only three recognised groups: Armenians, Greeks and Jews. Despite their special status, they, like other minority groups (such as Catholics, Syriacs, Protestants, Alevi, etc.) have no legal personality and cannot as a group buy or own properties or seek legal redress. Currently these groups can own property through separate foundations.
The state only allows the training of Sunni clerics while restricting that of other religious groups. The Greek Orthodox Theological Seminary on Halki island near Istanbul was closed in 1971. Turkey’s Jewish community can practise its religion freely. Synagogues are under government protection. Anti-Semitism, especially in print and social media, remains an issue in Turkey. Turkish social media users used the coronavirus outbreak to promote anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, however, Turkey is the only Muslim majority country that actively contributes to the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.
On 18 May 2022, the Directorate General of Immigration Management stated that there are 5,506,304 foreign nationals in Turkey, including Syrians under temporary protection. Turkish legislation provides people in need of international protection with a broad range of rights upon registration with the authorities. However, the existing legal framework has some shortcomings, largely due to the scale of the refugee problem. Since 2014, thousands of Arabic-speaking Christians (mainly Chaldeans and Syriacs) have entered the country. Distributed in more than 80 Turkish cities, these refugees must remain where they are registered in order to receive government financial aid. They are permitted to work, but again only where they are registered. The exact number of non-Muslim refugees in Turkish cities is unknown. Christian refugees do not have meeting places, buildings for worship, and they cannot move freely or participate in celebrations.
Incidents and developments
During the period under review, politics and religion have become even more inextricable with serious consequences not only for the citizens of Turkey, but also for its neighbours. With the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, Turkey attempts to position itself as a leader of the Islamic world. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, particularly after 2016, put Islam at the centre of Turkish politics using it to exercise soft power, through both formal and informal channels. Over the two-year period, President Erdoğan also used, and continues to use, economic means to gain influence and strengthen Turkey’s image in the Islamic countries and especially in Africa. Turkey intensified its expansionist engagement via the Diyanet by building mosques, religious establishments, supporting charitable organisations and activities, as well as supporting Islamic communities.
Some international political activities have impacted religious communities inside Turkey, of note the ongoing tensions resulting from the Azeri-Armenian war (with Turkey militarily supporting Azerbaijan), and the arrival of Russian asylum seekers fleeing the military draft for the war in Ukraine. These external factors have negatively affected the normal Turkish disposition for tolerance as evidenced through social media. During the period under review, posts of hate speech about Armenians as well as xenophobic comments towards the foreign and non-Muslim profile of the richer Russian newcomers were prolific, ominous signs for religious freedom in Turkey.
Within the country minority religious communities live in a context in which discrimination borders on what Pope Francis described as “polite” persecution; when laws are changed in such a way that non-Muslim religious groups encounter so many legal obstacles regarding their activities (mainly urgent social services to the vulnerable) that the freedom of their members is effectively curtailed. The impact of these impediments over the long run is a key factor spurring the migration of minority faith groups out of Turkey.
A salient example is the myriad of regulations imposed on “religious foundations” or administrative entities recognised by the government. The foundations exist to manage all legal and financial aspects related to buildings and sites owned by non-Muslim religious groups, including schools, churches, hospitals, nursing homes, etc. There are a total of 167 minority foundations in Turkey, of which 77 are Greek, 54 Armenian, 19 Jewish, 10 Assyrian, three Chaldean, two Bulgarian, one Georgian and one Maronite. Under Ottoman rule, the legal personality of these foundations was secured by law in 1912 but for nearly a century problems related to the right of ownership of real estate have continued due to the interpretation of the law.
The last board elections of the Minority Foundations took place in 2010 with members elected for four years. The law, however, was abruptly suspended in 2013, causing more administrative problems. A new law was then to be put into effect within six months, the responsibility of the Directorate General of Foundations. In the face of the latter’s inaction, the government issued a new regulation on 18 June 2022. According to this regulation, despite the many uncertainties, it was determined that foundation elections could be held in 2022, however, this proposal introduced serious problems; the deliberate vagueness of the new regulation effectively stripped control of the healthcare institutions from the Churches and passed these on to the Ministry of Health.
The new regulation also imposed new obstacles, of note the number of board members was fixed and a geographical place of residence was imposed. Specifically, to be elected to the Board of Directors of Minority Foundations, one must reside for at least six months in a particular geographic area, regardless of whether there are other members of the religious community living there. This limitation seriously affects Christian communities with few and dispersed members, but who use the services offered to their community even if they live elsewhere – for example the Armenian schools of Kalfayan, Tıbrevank, Getronagan, Karagözyan that are not district institutions. The Greek communities too have a very small number of voters and are unable to reach the numbers set by the new regulation so, they cannot constitute a board and their foundation is destined to disappear. This is also a problem for communities such as those Assyrian and Jewish that do not live where the foundation centres are located. The three dioceses of the Latin Catholic Church in Turkey (Istanbul, Izmir, and Anatolia) sought to overcome the legalistic burden imposed by exploring options other than foundations in order to continue operating the Catholic institutions, such as schools, hospitals, churches, and nursing houses, by, for example, being dependent on the bishops. Two bishops agreed to create associations and one continued activity through an existing trade company.
Another major problem for all Christian communities is the lack of seminaries to train clerics. Only Sunni Islam can de facto be taught in schools. The multitude of bureaucratic traps contributing to a reduction in services by minority communities not only produces less vocations, but less staff to run the schools and hospitals, thus creating a vicious circle of legalistic obstacles and reduced presence.
As of 2022, the Turkish Protestant community consisted of approximately 186 churches and communities of various sizes, mostly in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. Most Protestant communities solve the restrictions on places of worship by establishing associations and foundations and by renting or purchasing places such as independent buildings, shops, warehouses that are not in traditional church building architecture. Consequently, however, most of these locations lack the status of places of worship and thus cannot benefit from the advantages such as reductions in costs of electricity and water, and tax exemptions normally provided. If they introduce themselves as a Church to the public, they are warned that they are not legal and risk being closed. Protestant communities in Turkey presently have a legal personality for 119 communities, including 13 foundations, 20 foundation representations, 33 Church associations and 53 representations affiliated to these associations. The remaining communities do not have legal personality with about 15 of these home communities, and six communities meeting in offices. About 13 Protestant Churches gather in historic church buildings with other communities using public spaces that they own or rent, without having a legal personality.
In addition to the restrictions on locations, the Protestant community has no opportunity to locally train pastors. The significant increase in the number of chaplains, the spiritual leaders of local churches, reflects the influx of foreign national Protestant pastors, though many were prevented from entering Turkey, or forced to leave Turkey for negation of residence permits or visas.
Despite the challenges, the Catholic Archbishop of Izmir, Martin Kmetec, sees hope in the flourishing relations with other Christian denominations – notably their joint celebrations during Christmas and Easter – and through the positive response by all Turks, regardless of religious tradition, to Catholic charitable activities, for example food and health services. During a celebration of the “Day of Fraternity”, the Archbishop brought to the local Imam copies in Turkish of the pontifical documents “Fratelli Tutti” and “Laudato Sii”. Also, the Archbishop mentioned that they share churches for celebrations when other Christians do not have their own temple, and that they opened a bookshop for the Bible Society together with the Armenian.
Prospects for religious freedom
The systemic discrimination of religious minorities in Turkey is mostly legalistic, not bloody, but the result in the long run appears the same. Restrictive legal conditions and social pressure are transforming this country, once famous for its multiculturalism, into a mono-religious and mono-cultural society. The prospects for freedom of religion remain negative.
Turkey