Legal framework on freedom of religion and actual application
Mozambique is a secular state that enshrines the separation between the state and religious denominations (Article 12, 1 and 2 of the 2004 Constitution), a principle that cannot be amended (Article 292 c). The constitution recognises the organisational freedom of religious denominations, their freedom to carry out their functions and freedom of worship, in conformity with the state legislation (Article 12.3), as well as their “right to pursue their religious aims freely and to own and acquire assets for realising their objectives” (Article 54.3). The state “shall recognise and esteem the activities of religious denominations in order to promote a climate of understanding, tolerance and peace, the strengthening of national unity, the material and spiritual well-being of citizens, and economic and social development” (Article 12.4).
The constitution recognises all citizens’ equality before the law and their equal rights with no discrimination on religious grounds (Article 35), and bans any discrimination, persecution, prejudges, or deprivation of rights, benefits, or exemptions from duties “on the grounds of his faith or religious persuasion or practice” (Article 54.2). All citizens are free “to practice or not to practice a religion” (Article 54.1), and their right to religious freedom is non-derogable even in a stage of siege or national emergency (Article 286). The right to conscientious objection is guaranteed under the law (Article 54.5). Access to civil service cannot be obstructed on grounds of religion (Article 251.1). Personal data regarding philosophical or ideological beliefs or religious faith are protected, and the use of computerised means for recording and processing them individually is prohibited (Article 71.1). Political parties cannot use names “containing expressions that are directly related to any religious denominations or churches, and from using emblems that may be confused with national or religious symbols” (Article 76), and professional associations and trade unions should be independent from Churches or religious denominations (Article 86.3). Article 39 foresees the punishment by law of “all acts intended to undermine national unity, to disturb social harmony or to create divisions or situations of privilege or discrimination” based on, among other grounds, religion. The protection of places of worship shall be ensured by the state (Article 54.3). Public education cannot be confessional (Article 113.3) and the state cannot follow any particular religious or ideological guidelines (Article 113.5). Civil effects of religious marriage and the requirements for its registration are established by law (Article 119.4). NGOs, including religious ones, must register with the Ministry of Justice.
The relations between the Republic of Mozambique and the Holy See, based on the principles of cooperation, independence and autonomy, are governed by an agreement signed in 2011 which recognises the Catholic Church in Mozambique as holding “legal personality and the right to carry out its apostolic mission, guaranteeing the public exercise of its activities, carried out directly or through its institutions, in conformity with the Mozambican legal system and its ethical principles” (Article 5.1), including her “right to exercise pastoral, spiritual, formative and educational activities in all its training, educational, health and social service institutions.” (Article 12). Catholic marriages have civil effects through its registration (Article 14.3). The secrecy of the confessional, including the right to refuse to testify before state organs, is inviolable, as are the ecclesiastic archives (Article 10). Catholic education is recognised, including the right to religious teaching in Catholic institutions (Article 15).
Religious Demography
Mozambique is predominantly a Christian country (5.7 million Catholics, 2.5 million Protestants), with a large Muslim community (3.6 million - mostly Sunni) the majority in the northern provinces of Niassa (61 percent) and Cabo Delgado (54 percent), and the coastline areas. Southern Mozambique and its main cities are predominantly Christian. The Brazilian Neo-Pentecostal Universal Church of the Kingdom of God has known a rapid expansion in the country and the Zionist religion is practiced by 3.1 million Mozambicans. Traditional African religious communities are also strongly represented, particularly in rural regions. In the Province of Cabo Delgado – where most of jihadist attacks have taken place – Catholics are high in numbers (around 36 percent), and smaller communities of other religious denominations (Protestants and Zionists) are also present.
The Political Context
After the independence from Portugal in 1975, a civil war erupted in the country involving the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). The war, that caused over 1 million deaths, ended with the General Peace Accords signed between Mozambique’s ruling party, the FRELIMO, and the RENAMO, in Rome on 4 October 1992, thanks to the mediation of the Sant’Egidio Catholic community, the Archbishop of Beira, Jaime Pedro Gonçalves, and the Italian government. Since then, there have been two other peace agreements (5 September 2014, and 6 August 2019). Churches, and in particular the Catholic Church, have a certain credibility and reputation in Mozambique as promoters of reconciliation, especially since Pope John Paul II visited the country in 1988 and called for peace.
The Marxist-Leninist FRELIMO regime initially banned religious teaching, nationalized religious institutions, and persecuted religious leaders though some researchers suggest that FRELIMO had a more benevolent religious policy. After 1981, the situation improved, and the relations with the Catholic Church took on a more positive nature. Two Muslim organisations were established: the Islamic Council of Mozambique (CISLAMO), and the Islamic Sunni Congress of Mozambique. FRELIMO supported CISLAMO – which empowered southern Salafists at the expense of the northern Sufis - and was tasked to manage Muslim institutions. Consequently, a young generation of northern Mozambican Muslims were educated in Salafist tenants abroad, and when they returned, they felt marginalised. Their frustration led to the creation in 1989, outside of the CISLAMO, of Ahl al-Sunna – often referred to as al-Shabaab, or “The Youth” – that became a popular grassroot-level movement building madrassas and mosques and running solidarity programs. Youth were also given training at international Islamic universities or offered small business loans. Although Mozambique has had no history of Islamist militancy, and traditional Muslim-Christian relations, including in the northern regions, were peaceful and respectful towards each other, a certain political rivalry developed from the fact that Christians, in their majority ethnically Makondé, supported the ruling party FRELIMO, and Muslims, ethnically Mwani, endorsed the main opposition party RENAMO.
Since the country’s independence in 1975, FRELIMO has dominated the political space. After the introduction of multiparty elections in 1994, allegations of electoral fraud were widespread as FRELIMO continued winning majorities. In the most recent 2019 elections, President Nyusi of the ruling FRELIMO party scored 73 percent of the vote and, as FRELIMO received the most provincial votes, it was entitled to choose the governors of the country’s 10 provinces. A sense of frustration and exclusion by the Muslim ethnic Macua and Mwani in Cabo Delgado regarding state policies and benefits, mixed with an explosive Salafist discourse by local Mwani preachers (and some Kenyan preachers in contact with the Mwani religious leaders), created a breeding ground for jihadists that exploited local grievances against the government.
The Social and Economic Context
Mozambique is listed 147th out of 180 countries in the world in the Corruption Perceptions Index. The country is the 7th least developed country in the world in the Human Development Index, and steadily declining in the Global Fragility Index since 2014. In the Cabo Delgado province, statistics reveal the extremely precarious situation: 76.4 percent of households do not have access to sanitation; 56.1 percent lack access to safe water sources, and 21.9 percent to health facilities; 86.6 percent of children live in households without access to electricity; 45 percent of children under five years suffer chronic malnutrition; and 55.7 percent of the school age population have never attended school. The rate of illiteracy in Cabo Delgado is high, 12.5 percentage above the national average (people aged 15 and above: 66.8 percent female and 36.7 percent male), and only 30 percent of the population understands Portuguese, the official language of the country. Both Christian and Muslim religious leaders have warned about the “deep humanitarian crisis” worsened by terrorist violence and Covid-19 restrictions.
In contrast to this human misery, following the discovery of a vast quantity of natural gas off the northern coast of Mozambique in 2010, Cabo Delgado has become the region with the largest investment projects for LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) exploitation in Africa. Analysts forecast that transnational energy companies are anticipated to spend up to $100bn. But locals say they have seen little benefit as the jobs created go to highly skilled expatriates and not to them. Moreover, the development of the projects entailed the forced resettlement of thousands of farmers and fishermen, pushing them ever deeper into poverty. The prevailing opinion among the local population is that this is a deliberate and well-organized strategy to expel them from their lands in order to profit from its rich resources, including gas and graphite, an essential component for electric car batteries. The government provoked broader discontent in early 2017, when they expelled, sometimes violently, thousands of artisanal miners holding concessions near Montepuez.
It is this social, economic, and political context of dire poverty, corruption, and frustration among youth that enabled radicalised Islamic preachers, often trained abroad, to expand their hate messages and recruit young men in Mozambique. Foreign jihadist and local gangs committed their first attack in Cabo Delgado in October 2017 when 30 terrorists of “Ahl Al Sunna Wa-Al Jamâa” (ASWJ), also known as “Ansar al-Sunna” or “al-Shabaab” (unrelated to the Somali terrorist group of the same name), stormed a police station in the strategic city of Mocimboa da Praia killing two officers. ASWJ reportedly pledged allegiance to ISIS as early as April 2018, and was acknowledged by ISIS as an affiliate in August 2019 under the name “Islamic State Central African Province” (ISCAP) – a combined group of ASWJ in Mozambique and ADF in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The Islamic State began referring to IS-Mozambique (IS-Moz or ISM) separately from ISCAP-DRC in May 2022.
Incidents and Developments
Since May 2018, ASWJ’s attacks became less discriminate and more violent, including beheadings and the kidnapping of women and girls. The sophistication and strategy of the attacks were developed, as was the frequency, after mid-2019 as terrorists appeared to be better armed, better financed (increasingly supported through illegal trade) and with more recruits specifically: Mozambique Defence and Security Forces’ deserters, the influx of foreign trainers, and greater numbers of youth attracted by the salary offers. Some terrorists sought legitimisation seeking local community support and justifying their actions as the retaking of control over areas historically controlled by Muslim sultanates along the Swahili coast.
From July 2021 onwards the Mozambican military, with the support of Rwanda and SADC soldiers (to which South Africa is the main contributor), freed the natural gas fields enabling the resumption of exploitation which had been stopped in April 2021. IS-Mozambique continues to target mining projects (graphite and precious minerals) pushing its “maritime jihad,” to control coastal areas.
The government’s response to the terrorist jihadism is primarily a military one. Although with some success, the human rights costs have been high. Relying on a corrupt and ill-trained national army, private mercenaries as well as the Rwandan military, the security forces have attacked journalists and targeted the Muslim community with arbitrary detentions and prosecutions increasing their fears and antagonism towards state authorities.
In May 2021, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted a resolution demanding the government “cease mass killings, extrajudicial and arbitrary executions, to grant protection to civilians and to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of the violations.” International observers criticise the “ineffective and brutal counterinsurgency led by a corrupt government” that has not solved the root causes of the terrorist problem nor alleviated its dramatic consequences including the reconstruction of basic infrastructures, houses, and places of worship. Local Catholic organisations too question the military solution as the allocation of resources for the counter-offensives is three times more than what is allocated for water supply, health, and social assistance. Juliasse Ferreira Sandramo, the Catholic Bishop of Pemba, highlighted the need “to give hope to young people who would otherwise be tempted to recruit into jihadist ranks”.
Religious leaders have been diligent in working together to seek peace. On 3 January 2022, Christian and Muslim leaders published their “Interfaith Declaration of Pemba”, committing to work together in preaching “the genuine meaning of religion so that society does not see religion as the cause of any conflict, in particular Islamic religion, the one most affected by prejudice.” In an attempt to reinforce the anti-terrorist fight, Mozambique’s parliament adopted a stricter anti-terror law in May 2022, and, in December 2022, a bill legalising local militias to combat jihadists in Cabo Delgado. The Tanzanian army is also securing its territory bordering Cabo Delgado to avoid the terrorist infiltration.
Violent incidents
According to ACLED data, over 4,000 people have been killed since the start of northern Mozambique’s conflict in October 2017. In 2021 alone, 384 attacks resulted in 1,127 civilian deaths. The UNHCR reports 1,028,743 IDPs in North Mozambique caused by the jihadist violence (935,130 in Cabo Delgado).
The victims are both Christians and Muslims who do not accept the jihadist radical agenda. The spokesman for the Catholic Diocese of Pemba in the northern part of the country, Fr Kwiriwi Fonseca, confirmed that in predominantly Muslims areas jihadists force Christians to convert to Islam or face death: “those young men who accept to convert are trained to fight in their ranks, and girls are raped and forced to become their ‘brides’.”
In March 2021, ASWJ jihadists attacked the northern coastal town of Palma killing dozens of civilians and destroying much of the town’s infrastructure, including banks, a police station, and food aid warehouses. As a result of the attack, the French energy company Total closed its Afungi project, “one of the largest energy projects in southern Africa”. On 4 August, a church and a primary school in Niassa, including all the school’s equipment, were burned down by terrorists. On 15 December 2021, jihadists beheaded one person, set fire to several huts and ransacked five villages in Macomia (Cabo Delgado) during a raid.
On 15 January 2022, jihadists attacked, for the third time in one month, the village Nova Zambezia in Macomia (Cabo Delgado), and beheaded three men. Terrorists attacked several villages in the Nangade district, bordering Tanzania, in mid-February, confining their residents for some days. The group beheaded three people and looted several items from the homes of the population. ISIS operatives attacked the island of Matemo (Cabo Delgado), killing seven soldiers and wounding several others. Al-Naba, the ISIS weekly journal, highlighted on 17 March their intention, with this attack, to destroy the tourism industry in Mozambique.
On 2 June, al-Naba published news of three attacks claimed by ISIS on 29-30 May against three Christian villages in the Meluco area of Cabo Delgado; the residents’ houses and their possessions were set on fire during the attacks. On 19 June, ISIS attacked the Christian village of Makaya (Ancuabe District, Cabo Delgado) beheading two Christians and setting two churches on fire. On 22 June, ISIS attacked the Christian village of Capani (Ancuabe District) burning homes and properties. On 23 June, al-Naba reported IS-Mozambique’s claim to have killed at least thirty-three individuals, ten members of the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces and twenty-three Christian residents. Nine churches and more than 250 homes were set on fire leaving over 11,000 residents homeless. On 24 June, IS-Mozambique attacked the Christian villages of Nambini and Nakoy (Macomia region) setting several homes and a church on fire. On 26 June, IS-Mozambique attacked the Christian village of Tandako (Macomia, Cabo Delgado), killing a Christian resident and wounding another; several homes and a church were set on fire. On 27 June, IS-Mozambique attacked the Christian village of Mahican (Ancuabe, Cabo Delgado) executing a Christian resident.
On 6 September, an 84 year-old Catholic Comboni missionary, Sister Maria De Coppi, was brutally killed in Chipene (Nampula province) along with three other persons because, as the murderers alleged, she was “over-committed to the spread of Christianity”. The attackers destroyed the mission's facilities including the church, hospital, and primary and secondary schools.
In October, the Islamic State claimed attacks on four villages with a Christian majority in Macomia (Nguida and Litandacua villages), Muidumbe (Mandava village), and Nangade (Ntoli village) districts in northern Cabo Delgado.
On 10 November 2022, a message was spread in social media by IS-Mozambique reiterating its intention to establish a caliphate and demanding Christians and Jews to convert to Islam or pay tax if they wanted to avoid death.
On 30 December 2022, jihadists attacked two Christian villages in northern Mozambique leaving two people dead and four injured and causing many people to flee their homes. ISIS-Mozambique claimed to have attacked the “village inhabited by Christians” and clashed with “Christian militias”.
In view of the ineffectiveness of the security forces to control the insurgents, many local populations – Muslims and Christians – have formed their own civil defence groups.
Prospects for freedom of religion
Despite the reduced capabilities of IS-Mozambique to carry out large attacks, they remain operational and continue their deadly assaults, proclaiming their goal to establish a caliphate. Religious freedom is under grave threat due to the permanent insecurity with both Christians and Muslims targeted. The government, supported by militarily assistance from 24 countries as well as foreign mercenary troops, has enormous difficulties eliminating the jihadist terrorist groups and providing safety for their residents, in particular in the Cabo Delgado province. A risk of extension of IS-Mozambique to neighbouring countries especially, Tanzania, is of further concern.
While Christian and Muslim leaders continue denouncing the violence and promoting interreligious dialogue in efforts to delegitimize jihadism, it will be insufficient without addressing the underlying social and economic inequalities plaguing the youth especially in the poorer regions. This is especially true in the northern provinces where international companies extract enormous resource wealth with minimal benefit to the local economy and populations fomenting a vicious cycle of poverty, frustration, and violence. The prospects for religious freedom remain dire.
Mozambique