Legal framework on freedom of religion and actual application
The right to freedom of religion or belief in Moldova is enshrined in its 1994 constitution. Pursuant to Article 10 (2), “The State shall recognize and guarantee the right of all citizens to the preservation, development and expression of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity.”
With respect to equality, Article 16 (2) recognises that: “All citizens of the Republic of Moldova shall be equal before the law and public authorities, regardless of the race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion, political affiliation, property or social origin.”
Article 31 (1-4) guarantees freedom of conscience, which includes the right to worship freely. Religious groups can “organize themselves and operate according to their own statutes under the rule of law.” However, they cannot show enmity to each other. Such groups are independent from the state, but can enjoy its “assistance in the army, hospitals, penitentiaries, nursing homes and orphanages.”
According to Article 32 (3), the law bans and will prosecute actions “aimed at denying and slandering [...] the State and people, the instigation to sedition, war of aggression, national, racial or religious hatred”.
In matters of education, Article 35 (8-9) stipulates that the state ensures that education is secular, but also guarantees “freedom of religious education” and parents’ right to choose their children’s education.
Lastly, the Moldovan parliament has the power to pass organic laws related to religious worship (Article 72, 3, l).
Despite the constitution’s apparent neutrality in religious affairs, Article 15 of the “Law on religious denominations and their component parts” acknowledges the “special importance and leading role of the Orthodox Christian religion, and of the Moldovan Orthodox Church in the life, history and culture of the people of Moldova.” Article 4 (4) grants a special status to the Moldovan Orthodox Church (MOC) and prohibits “abusive proselytism”.
Registration of religious communities with the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) is not compulsory, but it provides benefits, ranging from tax exemptions and residence permits for missionaries, to granting religious communities a legal status enabling them to own property and land, build churches, publish religious literature, open bank accounts, hire employees and create associations and foundations.
Despite legal reforms religious minorities still face difficulties in registering as their application can be denied “on the grounds that ‘97% of the population of Moldova is Christian’”.
The President of The Republic of Moldova, Maia Sandu, promulgated a law for the modification and completion of some legislative acts, which introduced administrative and criminal responsibility for holocaust denial and insulting the memory of victims.
According to the Human Freedom Index, over the last 10 years the freedom to establish religious organisations worsened in Moldova as more legal and regulatory restrictions were introduced.
Although Transnistria is internationally recognised as a part of Moldova, it has been de facto independent since 1992. Russian troops stationed in the breakaway region and the conflict in Ukraine sparked fears in Moldova that it could become Russia’s next target. This context supports the privileged status of the MOC in the disputed territory to the detriment of minority religious groups. The Transnistrian de facto legislation neither complies with international standards, nor guarantees equality for diverse religious groups.” Certain laws adopted in 2016 imposed restrictions and penalties related to the unauthorised distribution of religious literature, preaching in public spaces, and organisation of religious activities in residential buildings.
Incidents and developments
Moldova’s struggles with deficiencies in applying the rule of law and pervasive corruption have led to large-scale emigration; nearly 25 percent of the population lives or works abroad contributing, through remittances, to one quarter of the national GDP. Many Moldovans opt for Romanian passports for easy access to the Schengen Area.
Orthodox Christians demographically dominate the country and wield great influence over the social life of Moldovan citizens (whether Russians, Ukrainians, ethnic Moldovans, or others) and is divided between competing communities. The Moldovan Orthodox Church (MOC), also known as the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova, is a self-governing Metropolitanate subordinate to the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), which includes an estimated 91.4 percent of all Moldovan Christians (2019 census); the smaller (3.7 percent as of 2019) Bessarabian Orthodox Church (BOC), also known as the Metropolis of Bessarabia, is subordinate to the Romanian Orthodox Church.
MOC and BOC competition generates conflicts over Church property. An Orthodox priest, Fr Marin Florinel, registered a rebuilt church on 23 August 2017 as an Orthodox Parish of Assumption of the Virgin within the Bessarabian Metropolia, in Dereneu, Calarasi. A year later in March 2018, Fr Florinel was forcibly removed by a group of people and Fr Alexandru Popa was brought to serve the church. Fr Marin Florinel improvised an altar in one of the buildings near the church and began to serve supportive parishioners. In a local electoral campaign in 2019, Fr Alexandru Popa as well as other clerics of the MOC publicly supported and promoted the socialist Revenco party. The Revenco victory resulted in the 21 August 2020 changes in the State Register in which the aforementioned church passed under the canonical subordination of the MOC. In 2021, a similar dispute arose over a church in Răzeni when the parish priest died and his sister inherited the land on which the church was built. The sister brought in a new parish priest from the MOC, chasing away the resident priest (her brother’s son), Fr Andrei Cotorobai.
Although Churches and religious associations do not play an official role in the country’s political system or law-making process, the Orthodox Churches in Moldova publicly comment on political issues and openly support certain politicians. In return, political parties maintain close ties with the Orthodox clergy and financially support Church actions. Furthermore, the MOC has strong ties with Russia and, for decades, has been named by US sources as promoting Russia’s political agenda intervening in the electoral process in favour of more conservative, pro-Russian parties and candidates. Despite this, the MOC has never denied the legitimacy of democratically elected authorities, evidenced by the recognition of Maia Sandu’s victory, the more independent and pro-EU candidate, over the MOC preferred Igor Dodon, the pro-Russian incumbent.
The attempts of the Catholic, Lutheran, and Jewish communities to regain title to property confiscated during the Soviet era or to obtain similar properties, continued to fail. On 2 December 2021, the European Court of Human Rights (EHCR) pronounced their decision in the case Roman Catholic Diocese of Chisinau v. Republic of Moldova. In 2009 the applicant Church requested from the Republic of Moldova the return of the assets nationalized by the former Soviet regime in the 1940s. With the government refusal, the applicant Church initiated a civil action seeking recognition of its right to property based on the general provisions of the constitution and the civil code, which guarantee the right to property. The application was dismissed by the national courts, deemed unfounded based on the legislation in force providing for the possibility of returning assets confiscated and nationalised by the Soviet regime only to individuals subjected to political repressions. The same guarantees did not extend to religious entities. The EHCR declared the application unfounded on the grounds that the remedies available at national level had not been exhausted.
Religious freedom in Moldova concerns not only its legal recognition, but also the wider societal perception of religion. In December 2022, according to the data of the Public Opinion Barometer (BOP), about 62.5 percent of the inhabitants of Moldova trusted the Church, down from 72.6 percent in 2021. Although the Church remains a trusted institution, the downgrading of the Orthodox Church’s social rating could be attributed to Russia’s actions in Ukraine and the MOC’s ambiguous reaction. Metropolitan Vladimir called on the faithful “to pray for peace and an end to the military conflict in Ukraine”, however has remained silent about who triggered the war.
Moldova’s small Muslim community is currently represented by the Islamic League, an organisation which was granted official status in 2012 following a decade of unsuccessful attempts and protests by the Orthodox Church. In the period under review there were, however, no incidents with anti-Muslim bias.
Before the Second World War, Jews were a minority group, but represented up to 40 percent of the Chișinău city’s population. The Holocaust, however, and migration to Israel following the dissolution of the Soviet Union reduced the size of the Jewish community. There were, however, no incidents reported with anti-Semitic bias.
Concerning other minorities there were some changes concerning the Falun Gong and Falun Dafa Associations. Following a decision by the ECHR, Falun symbols (one large and four small swastikas) were finally removed from the governmental register of extremist material, as per a 2015 court decision, and in 2020 a Supreme Court ruling overturned an earlier government decision to dissolve the Falun Gong and Falun Dafa Associations.
In the period under review, the MOC was accused of continuing to exercise a strong influence on government policies and “abusively interfered with the minority religious groups’ right to the freedom of religion”, most notably in Transnistria. The Human Rights Information Centre reported “that minority religious groups, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, Baptists, and Pentecostals, reported cases of verbal abuse, property destruction, and media discrimination as well as discrimination by MOC priests. The Muslim community reported biased attitudes, resulting in harassment in schools and negative media coverage.”
As most of the people of Transnistria are Christian Orthodox, local authorities have allegedly tried to limit the activity of other religious groups. Foreign religious groups are not permitted to register, and foreign individuals may not establish or join non-registered groups. For example, Jehovah’s Witnesses have been unable to obtain registration in Transnistria and have been consistently refused the right to conscientious objection for military service. Members of the Muslim community struggled to advance plans to establish a mosque in Tiraspol.
Prospects for freedom of religion
The Moldovan model of state-religion relations can be best described as preferential favouring the majority religion – a situation found in other post-socialist countries – with a close relationship between national identity and the dominant religious group. Although prospects for religious freedom remain comparatively stable, debates over religion will continue to be influenced by geopolitical factors as well as the oversized socio-political role of Orthodox institutions. This will continue to represent a challenge for the religious freedom of other minority groups.
Moldova