Legal framework on freedom of religion and actual application
Chad has had several constitutions since independence in 1960. The last, adopted in 2018, following the French principle of “laïcité”, defined the state as secular with a separation of state and religion. In April 2021, the 2018 constitution was replaced by a Transitional Charter following a coup sparked by the death of President Idriss Déby from wounds sustained in battle against rebel forces soon after he was re-elected president for a sixth term.
The Transitional Charter maintains the secularity of the state (Article 1) and contains further provisions that impact freedom of religion.
Under Article 8, “Any act undermining the republican form and the secularism of the State, sovereignty, independence, national unity is a crime of high treason and punished as such.”
Article 9 recognises “Fundamental rights and freedoms” and guarantees their exercise “under the conditions and forms provided by law.”
Article 10 declares that “Chadians of both sexes have the same rights and the same duties. They are equal before the law without distinction of race, origin or religion.”
Article 25 guarantees “freedom of opinion, expression, conscience and worship” exercised under conditions “defined by law.”
Article 36 upholds freedom of “association, assembly, press and publication”, while “The law determines the conditions for their exercise.”
According to Article 113, the Charter is in force for 24 months, but the Transitional President and the National Transitional Council can concurrently change the Charter, the latter by a qualified “majority of 2/3” (Article 114).
Article 117 declares: “Unless expressly repealed, all legislation and regulations in force that are not contrary to this Charter remain fully applicable.”
The Transitional Charter does not mention education, but in the 2018 constitution, Article 38 provided for free, compulsory, and secular education in public schools, allowing religious education in private establishments. Thus, several religious groups, including the Catholic Church, run private educational establishments across the country.
Under existing legislation, associations must register with the government. The Office of the Director of Religious and Traditional Affairs in the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Public Security, and Local Governance is responsible for religious affairs and mediates “inter-communal conflicts, reporting on religious practices, coordinating religious pilgrimages, and ensuring religious freedom.”
The High Council for Islamic Affairs of Chad is responsible for Islamic religious activities, including Arabic language schools and institutions of higher learning. Its members are approved by the government. In the mid-1990s, Chad tried to adopt a secular family law, but the proposal fell through because the country’s Muslim and Christian leaders could not agree on its terms.
As a result of the death of President Idriss Déby on 20 April 2021, the head of state, the country’s parliament and government were dissolved and a Transitional Military Council (Conseil militaire de transition, CMT) took power. The late president’s son, General Mahamat Déby, was appointed as provisional president, “violating the constitution that required the president of the parliament to succeed the late former president”.
The CMT was replaced in October 2022 by a Transitional Government (Articles 39 and 40 of the Transitional Charter, revised in October 2022). General Mahamat Déby remained president.
Article 72 of the Transitional Charter created a National Transitional Council (Conseil national de transition, CNT) that serves as a legislature with 197 members appointed by the Transitional President.
Muslims, mainly in the north, represent about 60 percent of the population while Christians (coexisting with animists in the south) number about 35 percent. Most of Chad’s Muslim community adhere to the Sufi Tijaniyah tradition with a minority following Wahhabism or Salafism. Wahhabism is banned and Wahhabi Muslims do not hold any representation at the High Council for Islamic Affairs.
Politically, Muslims “dominate the government and are overrepresented amongst government officials”. While Muslim and Christian holidays are officially recognised, and interreligious dialogue between religious leaders preaching peaceful coexistence is frequent, “there appears to be a growing pressure to neglect Sundays and Christian holidays”.
The 1958 French Civil Code is used for Christians while Muslims rely on Islamic practices and would prefer each community have their own family law. This, however, would violate the secular nature of the state, the constitution’s equality provisions for men and women, and Chad’s commitment to international treaties and conventions.
Incidents and developments
Chad is one of the least developed countries ranked 187 out of 189 countries globally. Poverty largely affects the rural areas “with the population living from subsistence farming or livestock breeding”.
Unlike other Sahel countries, religion has traditionally played a lesser role in Chadian politics. Both government and opposition leaders, as well as trade unions and civil society groups have avoided using religion to promote their interests.
Soon after the 2021 military takeover, the country’s Catholic bishops called for the transition process to be accompanied by international support. They also asked that an ad hoc committee be set up to pick the members of the National Transitional Council, to speed up the process of dialogue, and ensure that the National Transitional Council take the steps needed to draft a consensus-based constitution.
On 1 August 2022, the CMT and more than 40 rebel groups signed an agreement in Doha, Qatar, to hold an Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue (Dialogue national inclusif et souvereign, DNIS) starting on 20 August in the capital N'Djamena, as a step towards re-establishing civilian rule. To this end, the CMT agreed not to conduct “any military or police operations against the signing groups” in neighbouring countries. However, the main opposition group, the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (Front pour l’alternance et la concorde au Tchad, FACT), was not a party to the agreement.
Billed as the path to build consensus among the various stakeholders, the DNIS began to fall apart within weeks. In September, Chad’s Catholic bishops suspended their participation, and later formally withdrew, citing lack of inclusiveness and conditions for true dialogue. For Bishop Martin Waingue Bani of Doba, the DNIS was flawed from the start: “All this was adopted in a very confused, undemocratic way”.
The DNIS, which ended in October, brought together some 1,400 participants, from the CMT, as well as civilian and military opposition, and representatives of society groups. While not fully inclusive, it nonetheless covered a broad spectrum of opinion. Yet, instead of marking the end of the transition, the result was the postponement of elections until at least October 2024.
Just over a week after the DNIS ended, protests broke out, which led the government to impose a curfew and ban seven political parties. The crackdown that followed left at least 50 people dead and 300 wounded, with scores missing. For some observers, this quashed any hope for a peaceful transition to civilian rule, leading some opposition leaders to call on the International Criminal Court to investigate what they described as “crimes against humanity”.
Reacting to the protests and the violent repression by the authorities, Mgr Samuel Mbairabé Tibingar, Vicar General of the Archdiocese of N’Djamena, called for “calm and reconciliation”. Likewise, Sheikh Abdadahim Abdoulaye Ousmane, Secretary General of the Islamic Affairs Council of Chad (Conseil des affaires islamiques au Tchad), warned against all forms of manipulation. Stressing that the country’s problems were political in nature, not religious, he extolled “peaceful coexistence”.
Against this background of political turmoil is the complex reality of violent conflict. Local inhabitants confront a myriad of conflict drivers including ongoing intercommunal violence between farmer and herder ethnic groups; so-called “political-military” groups (former allies of President Idriss Déby) which, operating “primarily from southern Libya or Sudan”, attack government forces seeking power; fighting between “local self-defence groups and state security forces” in the “context of gold mining”; the “resettlement of the northerners in the southern areas of the country” with violence over land rights “between the indigenous and non-indigenous communities”; and jihadi groups such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State (IS) attacking particularly around Lake Chad. In Chad’s southwest region, kidnappings for ransom occur on a regular basis (often of children).
In July 2021, the UN published a report concerning community conflicts in Chad. The intercommunal violence within the first six months of the year “killed 309 people, injured 182, displaced over 6,500, led to the destruction of assets and livelihoods, and resulted in very strong tensions between communities”.
On 4 August 2021, at least 26 Chadian soldiers were killed in an ambush while patrolling near the Lake Chad region. On 21 September, nine people were killed in a terrorist attack on a village in the same area. In both cases, it is still unclear if the attacks were committed by Boko Haram or the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP).
On 3 November 2021, Archbishop Djitangar of N'Djamena lamented that “men in military uniform”, claiming to be members of the Chadian army, forced their way into the courtyard of Blessed Isidore Bakanja parish church in N'Djamena. For the prelate, this case was of great concern because it confirmed the contempt for people and places of worship by those supposed to protect them.
On 23 February 2022, Boko Haram, in the region of Lake Chad, killed five Chadian soldiers and injured many in a terrorist attack.
On 13 September 2022, violence erupted following a dispute “between a farmer and a herdsman who was accused of herding his flock into his field”. Following this, according to provincial prosecutors, clashes in several villages “left 19 dead, 22 injured and 18 arrested on both sides”.
For Chad’s Catholic community, there were some positive developments. 2022 saw the reopening of Our Lady of Peace Cathedral in N'Djamena, which had suffered major fire damage during the country’s second civil war in 1980. Also in the capital, the diocesan radio station, La Voix du Paysan (The Voice of the Peasant), was back on the air after having been suspended by the government’s media watchdog for “malpractice”.
The Catholic Church has been outspoken in its efforts to encourage peace. On 26 November 2022, the Catholic Bishops Conference of Chad (CET) decried “‘endemic violence’ in the North-Central African nation” […] “urging authorities to call for ‘a true inclusive national dialogue.’”
In a 21 December Christmas message, the CET addressed the youth stating: “Never use violence to solve your problems. Seek the path of non-violence. Cultivate the values of brotherhood, unity, truth, courage, hard work, and progress.” […] “As the Word of God teaches us, do not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good.”
Prospects for freedom of religion
Chad is experiencing a period of major turmoil. Internal conflicts related to land as well as intercommunal violence between farmers and herders and Arab and non-Arab groups, have been complicated by the presence of foreign jihadi militants such as Boko Haram and ISWAP, which have killed hundreds of people and displaced thousands. Although relations between Muslim and Christian religious leaders is generally positive with both playing an important role in advocating for peace and stability, the combination of all the aforementioned factors weighs heavily on freedom of religion and thus the prospects for this human right going forward are poor.
Chad